In this section, you can access to the latest technical information related to the FUTURE project topic.

Pricing decisions of competing supply chains under power imbalance structures

This paper investigates the effect of product substitutability and relative channel status on pricing decisions under different leadership scenarios of three cases: a single channel (Case 1), a dual exclusive channel without leadership and followership (Case 2) and a dual exclusive channel with leadership and followership (Case 3). The game rule between two channels is Stackelberg (Nash) game in case 3 (Case 2), while is Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) or Retailer Stackelberg (RS) within a channel. Our main findings conclude that channel members always gain more benefits from playing the leader's role regardless of the competition and the asymmetric related channel status. Nevertheless, in terms of the whole channels, the high product substitutability leads them to encounter a Prisoner’s dilemma in Case 2, and the Prisoner’s dilemma can be solved in Case 3. Further, whether the leader channel has incentives to playing the leader's role depends on the asymmetric relative channel status. Interestingly, consumers and channels are almost indifferent as to who is the market leader in Case 3. Some other managerial highlights are also presented in this paper.

» Author: Li Tao, Zhang Rong, Liu Bin

» Reference: Computers & Industrial Engineering

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